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The basic theoretical concepts of Rational-Emotive and
Rational-Behavior Therapy were discussed along with a
psychometric study of an inventory measuring irrational
tendencies.

The revised Irrational Personality Traits

Inventory Scale (IPTIS), an inventory reported to measure
how an individual thinks, feels, and acts, was investigated
as to the soundness of its psychometric characteristics.
More specifically, the purpose of this study was to:

(a)

determine the reliability of the revised IPTIS with a new
sample from an older population, i.e., college students,
(b) assess its concurrent validity with a measure of
neuroticism, and (c) evaluate the possible effects of a
socially desirable response set on the revised IPTIS
measure.
The subjects in this study were volunteers ranging in
age from 18 to 28.

The total sample of 207 was composed of

92 males and 115 females.

All subjects were group admin-

istered the revised IPTIS followed by the Eysenck Personality
Inventory (EPI).

The reliability of the revised IPTIS was

determined by a Guttman split-half reliability procedure.

Concurrent validity and the influence of social desirability
was assessed by employing a Pearson product moment correlation between the revised IPTIS and the criterion scales
of the EPI
The results suggested that the revised IPTIS was a
sound psychometric inventory with a wide range of variability
and was sensitive to varying degrees of rational and/or
irrational tendencies.

The inventory demonstrated adequate

reliability with strong internal consistency (r ---- .90,
p

< .01).

The revised IPTIS demonstrated good concurrent

validity with neuroticism (r = .68,

E < .01) and was not

significantly influenced by social desirability (r = -.23,
P

> .01).
It was concluded that the revised IPTIS appeared to be

a reliable and valid measure of irrational and/or neurotic
tendencies.

It did generalize and extend quite well to a

new sample from another population and maintained sound
psychometric characteristics.

The results supported and

extended the conclusions of Ross (1976) and also the ABC
theory of emotional disturbance as presented by Ellis (1962).
It was suggested that the revised IPTIS appeared to
provide a useful tool both for future research and clinical
practice.

vi

Introduction and Review of Literature
From the ancient Stoic philosopher, in the first
century A.D., Epictetus wrote in The Enchiridion:

"Men are

disturbed not by things, but by the view which they take of
them" (Ellis, 1973, p. 167).

In the mid 1950's Albert Ellis

began developing a theory of personality, psychopathology
and a method of psychotherapy drawing from and extending
this philosophy.

Summarized, Ellis (1962) states that A

is an objective event or stimuli, B is a cognitive evaluation of the event and C is the resulting emotional
response.

In other words, when a highly charged emotional

response follows a personally significant event, it may
appear that A causes C, but realistically the emotional
response is largely caused by the individuals belief or
cognitive evaluation.

Conclusions from what is now a

classic article by Schacter and Singer (1962) report that
cognitive factors appear to be indispensable elements in
any formulation of emotion.

Other studies by Schacter and

Wheeler (1962) and Latane' and Schachter (1962) support
their conclusions and the ABC theory of emotional disturbance.
Ellis (1962), in his system of psychotherapy, maintains
that since cognition precedes and accompanies emotions, one
1
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must begin changing cognitive evaluations before the
undesirable emotional response will be significantly
affected.

Agreeably, human beings function as whole orga-

nisms who think, feel, and act.

The degree of success in

therapy depends largely upon how well the individual
internalizes and incorporates rational cognition into daily
life.

Consequently, changing one's thinking is only the

initial, and generally the easiest, step toward behavioral
change.

Ellis believes that an individual's healthy, as

well as pathological, symptoms are not exclusively the
product of social learning, but the result of what he labels
"biosocial" learning (Ellis, 1973).

This is the interaction

between the way one thinks, feels, and acts.

In other

words, the environment interacts through the body and mind,
thus producing the self, i.e., an organism which is the
product of the interacting prerequisites.

The same is true

for all other living organisms, but mankind has cognitive
abilities or intellect and tends to be self-talking and
self-evaluating, having powerful and innately predisposed
tendencies to think in rational as well as irrational and
self-defeating ways.

This makes mankind uniquely neurotic

to greater or lesser degrees.

An individual behaving in an

irrational manner (such as depression) has a logical reason
within his or her irrational belief system (e.g., "I need
1116m and can't live without him.") for feeling helpless and
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hopeless just as 3ny living organism would if something
really needed was abruptly removed (e.g., air, water, food,
and shelter).
One basic symptom of emotional disturbance is demand
probably
ingness and intolerance of oneself and/or others,
s
the result of inconsistent love, approval, and succes
(either actual or perceived).

Misleadingly, individuals

love,
subjectively define merely their personal desire for
resulting
approval, success, and comfort as needs, oftentimes
in panic and self-defeating behaviors.

The degree of

formed and
pathology would depend on how strongly one has
holds to such demanding beliefs.

Habitual patterns evolve

self, and
during early childhood forming the personality or
there
will mcst likely continue in a similar pattern unless
thinking,
is a significant intervention allowing one to begin
feeling, and behaving more independently.

In short, to

nt
become less narrow-minded and more accepting and tolera
of reality.

The process of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET)

ng
involves actively confronting and disputing self-defeati
old
attitudes, thus helping the individual surrender the
3nd adopt new ways of evaluating the same or similar
objective events.

The individual is then given active home-

ts,
work assignments as an exercise in coordinating though
feelings, and behavior.
and
Cognition can be coordinated with bodily functions
strengthen

or weaken the organism through the process of

4
detachment.

When an individual cognitively evaluates an

event implicit verbalizations are used to describe and
understand the event, i.e., self-talk.

This is the mecha-

nism by which the individual either reinforces or works
toward extinguishing the well ingrained influences of the
past.

Thus Ellis concludes that it is not entirely one's

miserable past which causes the present undesirable emotion,
but the consistent reindoctrination of old and strongly
reinforced beliefs.
Several studies lend support that self verbalizations
affect emotional states.

Rimm and Litvak (1969) report that

affective verbal stimuli are more emotionally arousing than
neutral stimuli, concluding that self-verbalizations have
a direct influence on emotional arousal.

In another study,

using the galvanic skin response (GSR) as a measure of
affective arousal, Russell and Brandsma (1974) conclude
that irrational self-verbalizations were capable of producing an emotional response in line with Ellis

ABC theory

and predictions derived from classical conditioning theory.
Rational-Emotive theory appears to be well grounded in terms
of empirical research and practitioners of RET claim
remarkable success (DiLoreto, 1971; Ellis, 1957; Karst &
Trexler, 1970; Maultsby, 1971c; Meichenbaum, 1971;
Meichenbaum, Gilmore, & Fedoravicus, 1971; Taft, 1965;
Trexler & Karst, 1973; Trexler, 1973).

5
But what is considered to be rational or irrational?
Ellis (1962) presented eleven specific values or attitudes
which he considered to be irrational and common throughout
our culture.

He claimed that strong endorsement of these

sis.
values would inevitably lead to widespread neuro
Ellis'
McDonald and Games (1973), in an attempt to validate
relationeleven irrational values, reported significant
cks'
ships between those eleven values and (a) Eysen
ty Scale,
Neuroticism Scale, (b) the Taylor Manifest Anxie
and (c) Internal-External Locus of Control.

Their results

y that
were interpreted as providing support for the theor
the most part,
neuroticism and emotional disturbance is, for
m.
the result of harboring an irrational belief syste
a) deEmploying the ABC theory of Ellis, Maultsby (1971
m Rationalveloped a modification of RET and called his syste
Behavior Therapy (RBT).

He operationally defined rational

behavior around five criterion.

Maultsby stated that one's

tive reality,
behavior is rational if it (1) is based on objec
eliminates
(2) is life preserving, (3) is goal producing, (4)
nates signifisignificant emotional conflict, and (5) elimi
cant trouble with others.

The first criterion, i.e., objec-

essentials for
tive reality, is defined as that which has its
value judgexistence fulfilled (e.g., reality is free of
ments, neither good nor bad, it just is).

Or relating to

verbalizations of
cognition, objective reality is defined as
by a recording
facts and events that could be measured
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device (e.g., a camera) or other means, such as statistics.
Maultsby believes the brain functions poorly as a camera
and evaluates reality much the way a programed computer
would interpret and respond to incoming data.

One program

would differentiate the significant from the insignificant
data (analogous to perception) and a second program would
analyze the data (analogous to thinking).

The interaction

between the two would determine the direction and degree of
the response.

The second criterion is defined as thoughts

and behavior leading to preserving one's life.

The

remaining criterion are self-explanatory, though very
subjective in nature and fluctuating from time to time.
Goals change among and between individuals as does
tolerance to personal and environmental discomfort.

Thus,

rational behavior is not absolute, but must be tailored
among and between individuals to help achieve a common
goal, such as a more rational and unified society.

A

rationally thinking individual perceives or accepts reality
as it is and then acts in one's own self-defined best
interest in order to pursue individual goals.
When an event is perceived, it is evaluated using
symbols which are learned associations with reality.
Perceptions are then evaluated and labeled by one's attitudes over and over again.

Consequently, one learns to

form strong opinions about reality, which are many times
based on insufficient and inaccurate information, such as
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"snakes are slimy and evil," "that dirty louse," etc.

In

addition, other statements like, "I should not have failed
my final exam," in essence deny reality and often lead to
self-defeating behavior, e.g., guilt.

Realistically, one

, what he did because all of the
:
should have done exactl
prerequisites were there in order for the event to occur.
Consequently, if he desires to pass the next exam, he had
better work toward establishing the prerequisites, i.e.,
studying rather than prerequisites leading to selfdevaluation.

Actually, he wished he had not failed, but

wishing in this manner is quite distinct from reality.
This distinction is grossly evident in neurotic and/or
psychotic behavior.
Maultsby (1971a) collected numerous statements which
he found to be consistently adopted by clients with whom
he worked.

He categorized them into three separate

inventories measuring perceptions, beliefs, and traits.
For example:

"I am a real louse," is an inaccurate

perception stemming from the belief that, "I should not
have failed."
guilt.

The trait would be the symptom of anger or

Maultsby entitled his inventory, Your Irrational

Personality Trait Inventory Scale (YIPTIS).

The inventory

consists of the Common Perception Inventory, Common Belief
Inventory and Common Trait Inventory, totaling 137 items.
He incorporated al/ three measures since rational and/or
irrational tendencies are global patterns and not only a
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process of objective cognitive criteria.

In other words,

an individual can adopt irrational beliefs, but the degree
to which they are internalized is
and behavioral traits.

reflected by feelings

He noted that this inventory was

developed primarily as a counseling facilitator and not
specifically for research purposes.
Ross (Note 1) modified Maultsby's YIPTIS and designed
a revised form called Irational Personality Traits Inventory
Scale (IPTIS).

The instrument consists of 52 items designed

to assess the global degree to which high school students
have irrational perceptions, beliefs, and traits about
themselves and others.

The items were selected from the

initial 137 items by selecting only those which demonstrated high internal consistency (i.e., item-total
correlations greater than .40).

Developmental data were

collected from two stratified random samples of high
school students (n = 419 and 216).

He reported that the

instrument correlated significantly with the Spielberger
Trait Anxiety Scale (r = .78).

He concluded that his

findings were consistent with the theoretical notions of
irrationality and anxiety as explained by Maultsby (1971a).
His report also indicated that the instrument had high
internal consistency (r = .94).

The internal consistency

of perceptions, beliefs, and traits were felt in line with
Maultsby's operational definition of irrationality.
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In summary, the ABC theory of Elli.s holds that emotional
disturbance primarily results from consistent reindoctrination of unrealistic values adopted by an innately
predisposed and self-evaluating human being.

Individuals

imply agreement or disagreement to such values via implicit
verbalizations or self-talk, which may or may not be
accurate interpretations of reality.

Maultsby (1971a)

introduced a modification of RET and called his system RBT.
He presented five criterion for evaluating rational or
irrational tendencies.

These criterion for rational

behavior were a combination of objective and subjective
evaluations.

Throughout his years of clinical practice,

Maultsbv collected many irrational beliefs, faulty perceptions, and traits symptomatic of irrationality.

From

this collection he developed a personality inventory called
YIPTIS.

A revised form of this instrument, called the

revised IPTIS, was constructed by Ross (Note 1) drawing
from the YIPTIS item pool.

This new form was developed

with ninth, tenth, and eleventh grade high school students.
The revised IPTIS demonstrated sound psychometric characteristics as well as significant correlations with anxiety
with the original developmental sample.
The general purpose of this study was to extend Ross'
work to a new sample from another population.
specifically the study was designed to:

More

(a) determine the

reliability of the revised IPTIS with a new sample from an
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alder population, i.e., college students, (b) assess its
concurrent validity with a measure of neuroticism, and (c)
evaluate the possible effects of a socially desirable
response set on the revised IPTIS measure.
this study would be expected to:

The results of

(1) expand the reliability

and validity of the revised IPTIS by generalizing and
extending the results of Ross (Note 1) to a sample from an
of
older population while evaluating the possible influence
the
social desirability, (2) lend theoretical support to
ing
ABC theory, and (3) provide further basis for evaluat
research
the usefulness of the revised IPTIS for both future
and clinical practice.

Method
Revised IPTIS
The revised Irrational Personality Trait Inventory
Scale (IPTIS) is an instrument consisting of 52 items
designed to assess the degree to which individuals may have
irrational perceptions, beliefs, and traits about themselves and others.

Ross (Note 1) selected items from an

initial pool of 137 items on the YIPTIS (Maultsby, 1971a).
Only those items which demonstrated high internal consistency (i.e., item-total correlations greater than .40)
were selected.
Appendix A.

A copy of the inventory is presented in

The original developmental data for the

revised IPTIS were collected from two groups of ninth,
tenth, and eleventh grade high school students (n = 419 and
216).

The inventory showed a high degree of internal con-

sistency (r = .94) and correlated relatively highly with
the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale (r = .78).

The subject

response and scoring modes were on a self-rating five
point Likert scale ranging from "never" to "usually" in
regards to items identifying irrationality.

For the purpose

of the present study items were ordered randomly on the test
booklet and did not appear in the same order as in the
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original revised IPTIS.

This step was taken to reduce the

possible influence of response bias relating to item order.
Criterion Measures
The Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1968) was utilized as a measure of irrational and neurotic
tendencies.

Eysenck identifies neuroticism as indicative

of emotional lability and over-reactivity.

High scoring

individuals tend to be emotionally over-responsive and
have difficulties returning to a normal state after emotional experiences.
because:

The EPI was selected primarily

(1) it was reported to be a reliable and valid

measure of neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968), (2) it
was relatively short and took minimal time in administration, and (3) it also yielded a social desirability or
response set score.
Subjects
Subjects were volunteers from the total available
population of undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Western Kentucky University.
There were a total of 207 subjects consisting of 92 males
and 115 females between the ages of 18 and 28.
Procedure
The revised IPTIS was administered in a classroom
setting followed by the EPI during the spring semester of
the school year.

Instructions were given verbally and in

written form and are presented in Appendix A.

Subjects

13
were only identified by their sex and age.

Each was

instructed to record his/her responses on separate answer
sheets, i.e., one for each inventory.
Statistical Analysis
Both answer sheets were collected from each subject and
machine scored.

Statistical analyses were performed to

determine descriptive characteristics, reliability, and
validity.

A Guttman split-half reliability procedure was

used to assess internal consistency.

A Pearson product

moment correlation coefficient was employed to assess concurrent validity and influence of social desirability.
Results were reported significant at the .01 level.

Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics obtained in this study for the
revised IPTIS are presented in Appendix B.

A comparative

analysis of these statistics with those obtained by Ross
However,

was impossible since his data were not available.

the data from this study suggested that the revised IPTIS
was a sound inventory with a wide range of variability and
was sensitive to varying degrees of rational and irrational
tendencies.
The Guttman split-half yielded a reliability coefficient
of .90, p

< .01.

When compared with the results of Ross

(r = .94), the revised IPTIS did generalize and extend quite
well to a new sample from another population of older
subjects and maintained high internal consistency.

In

addition, it was found that random ordering of the items
did not significantly affect its reliability.

Consequently,

the revised IPTIS demonstrated adequate reliability in the
form of high internal consistency.
The Pearson product moment procedure between the
revised IPTIS and the neuroticism scale of the EPI resulted
in a concurrent validity coefficient of .68,

E < .01.

As

reported previously, Ross found a significant correlation
(r = .78) between the revised IPTIS and anxiety.
14

By
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comparing the two correlation coefficients, the revised
IPTIS was found to extend from a specific irrational trait,
i.e., anxiety, to a broader psychological measure of
neuroticism.

Consequently, the revised IPTIS demonstrated

good concurrent validity with a specific irrational trait
as well as the measure of neuroticism as defined by
Eysenck.

Thus, Maultsby's operational definition of

irrational tendencies (as measured by the revised IPTIS)
was consistent with Eysenck's broader notion of neuroticism.
The Pearson correlation procedure between the revised
IPTIS and the social desirability scale on the EPI
resulted in a concurrent validity coefficient of -.32,

E >

.01.

Consequently, a socially desirable response set

did not appear to be related to the measure of irrationality
obtained on the revised IPTIS.

In other words, the revised

IPTIS measure appeared independent of a "faking good"
response mode.
Rational theory, whether employing the techniques of
Ellis or Maultsby, is a very objective and humanistic
method of perceiving and facilitating the whole human being.
In psychotherapy attention is focused on thinking, feeling,
and acting with attempts to help others perceive or accept
reality as it is and then acting in one's own self-defined
best interest in order to pursue individual goals.
The revised IPTIS, an inventory that claims to measure

how an individual thinks, feels, and acts, was investigated
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as to the soundness of its psychometric characteristics.
More specifically it was to (a) determine the reliability
of the revised IPTIS with a new samp]e from an older
population, i.e., college students, (b) assess its concurrent validity wiLh

measure of neuroticism, and (c)

evaluate the possible effects of socially desirable
response set on the revised IPTIS measure.
The results from this study suggested that the revised
IPTIS was a sound psychometric inventory with a wide range
of variability and was sensitive to varying degrees of
rational and irrational tendencies.

The inventory

demonstrated good reliability with strong internal consistency.

It did generalize and extend quite well to a

new sample and another population of older subjects and
maintained sound psychometric characteristics.

In addition,

the revised IPTIS demonstrated good concurrent validity
with both a specific irrational trait, i.e., anxiety, as
well as a broader measure of neuroticism as defined by
Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968).

Finally, social

desirability or "faking good" did not appear significantly
related to the scores obtained on the revised IPTIS.
In conclusion, the revised IPTIS was demonstrated to
be a reliable and valid measure of irrational and/or
neurotic tendercies.

The results supported and extended the

conclusions of Ross (Note 1).

Also, Maultsby's operational

definition of irrational tendencies (as measured by the
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Eysenck's
revised IPTIS) were found to be correlated with
measure of neuroticism.

The results also lent support to

nted by
the ABC theory of emotional disturbance as prese
Ellis (1962).

Thus, the revised IPTIS appeared to provide

clinical practice.
a useful tool both in future research and
extending and
Future research may be directed toward
populations such as
generalizing the revised IPTIS to other
presently, inpatient/
younger or older sublects than reported
other specific
outpatient mental health facilities, and
neurotic traits.
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Revised IPTIS

Age

Name

Sex

Date

INSTRUCTIONS
be beliefs many people
The following statements descri
(observations) that people
hold, feelings, and perceptions
ide each statement is an
often make about themselves. Bes
the answer sheet not the
estimate range. Please mark on
t accurate and appropriate
booklet) the word which seems mos
to you.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

NEVER
SOMETIMES
OFTEN AS NOT
FREQUENTLY
USUALLY

r usual state of mind,
This form is concerned with you
experience regarding each
so answer with your most common
m honestly and be sure
item. Please respond to each ite
are no right or wrong
not to skip any statements. There
answers to any of the statements.
SOME- OFTEN FREALLY
NEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USU
1.

I believe I am a born
worrier.

a

2.

I won't be able to
accept myself until I
get more selfconfidence.

a

3.

No one seems to care
enough about me.

a

4.

It seems to me that I
don't live up to my
potential (i.e.,
abilities and talents). a

5.

I believe there is me
and another "real" me.

a

20
SOME- OFTEN FRENEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
6.

7.

8.

9.

I feel cut off or
alienated from people
or the world around
me.

a

I feel as though I
am me and not me at
the same time.

a

In order to get
people to like me,
I pretend to be different from how I
really am.

a

Even now, if I think
of regretted past
events, I still get
angry, aaxious or
depressed.

a

10. When I am upset or
angry about some
thing or someone, I
am likely to say
things like "why does
everything have to
happen to me?" or
"how could he or she
have done such a
thing?"

a

11. My emotions change
from one extreme to
another within minutes
without my knowing
why.

a

12. T don't get over
emotional hurts
quickly.

a

13. I am dissatisfied
with myself as a
person.

a
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SOME- OFTEN FRENEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
14. I am very sensitive
to social slights:
i.e., my feelings are
hurt easily.

a

15. My life seems worthless and unproductive.

a

16. I believe that if
people would just be
honest with me, I
many
wouldn't have
emotional problems.

a

17. When faced with a difficult task or something that I don't
want to do, I am likely
to start thinking that
"I can't do it" or "I
a
am going to blow it."
18. I feel inferior to some
a
other people.
19. I really get upset if
I think people are
thinking about me
things that I do not
like people to think
about me.

a

20. I have guilt feelings
about my failures.

a

21. I think that I am a
nothing, no good,
worthless person, and
I get very upset.

a

22. Even though I enjoy
someone's company, if
they don't love me or
care for me as much as
I do for ethem, I feel
badly.

a
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SOME- OFTEN FRENEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
23. I have tried to change
myself, but it seems
I can't do it.

a

24. I believe I need more
self-confidence.

a

25. I get very upset when
I am alone for many
hours or a day or so.

a

26. I am uncomfortably
depressed.

a

27. When trying to make
decisions, I change
my mind back and forth
while getting progressively upset about
the outcome.

a

28. What some people think
of me is as important
to my feelings as what
I think of myself.

a

29. I refuse to accept
myself when I am a
failure.

a

30. I don't seem to be as
good a person as I can
and ought to be.

a

31. I believe that if
certain people were to
treat me the way they
should, I could feel
better and/or accept
myself better.

a

32. The solution to most
of my problems is for
certain people to care
enough for me to meet
my dependency needs.

a
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SOME- OFTEN FRENEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
33. I feel anxious, or
nervous, or "highstrung"--almost like
I am waiting for an
unknown terrible
thing to happen.

a

34. I find myself
thinking about things
I don't want to think
about.

a

35. I wake up feeling
afraid to face the
day.

a

36. I worry about or I
get afraid of the "bad"
or negative things that
people, even strangers,
may think or say about
me, that I don't do some
harmless fun things
that I want to do.
a
37. It seems to me that
I am a failure.

a

38. I don't seem to have
enough self-confidence. a
39. Even though I don't
experience physical
pain, when people
behave toward me in an
undesirable manner, I
feel badly.

a

40. I really get upset if
I think that I have
been used.

a

41. I believe that I
would like and accept
myself better if I had
more self-confidence.

a

b

c

d

P
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SOME- OFTEN FRENEVER TIMES AS NOT QUENTLY USUALLY
42. I spend a lot of time
trying to decide what
the true meaning of
life is.

a

43. When people treat me
unfairly or unjustly,
it causes me emotional
pain that is worse than
a
most physical pain.
44. I actually hate
myself.

a

45. When I am attempting
a difficult task, I am
likely to give up
quickly and later
realize that I could
have done the task if
I had continued. Then
I feel guilty or dissatisfied with myself
as a person.

a

46. When things that
really matter to me
don't go right, it
upsets me very much.

a

47. I feel uncomfortable
lonely even when there
are people around me.

a

48. I get upset about
trivial things.

a

49. I get upset about
problems I have
getting along with
people.

a

50. The very time I
decide to be carefrec
and loose, something
bad always seems to
happen.

a
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51. When I don't stay a
little tense about
things I have to do,
I forget to do them.

a

52. It seems to me that I
am not intelligent
enough.

a

Revised IPTIS Descriptive Statistics
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Revised IPTIS Descriptive Statistics
(N = 207)

Mean

69

Std. Dev.

28

Variance

793

Skewness

.58

Kurtosis

.49

Range

168

Min. Score

3

Max. Score

171
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